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During the last two decades, there has been considerable controversy regarding the appro-
priate method of implementing monetary policy. One approach emphasizes market interest rates;
the other, nsonetary aggregates. This article sets forth the basic issues underlying this controversy.
It demonstrates the manner in which the market interest rate approach can leach to perverse
monetary actions; whereas the monetary aggregate approach reduces the hikehilsood of such a
DECIDING UPON an ultimate objective for
etarv policy, such as a more rapid increase in employ-
ment or a reduction in inflation, is only one part of
monetary policy. The policynlakers must also imple-
ment such a policy decision. A considerable amount
of study has been devoted to this problem, resulting
in numerous technical papers, several conferences,
and some rather sharp differences of opinion among
economists about the best way to implement policy
decisions, This article explains this problem in a
simplified form and highlights some of the areas of
disagreement.
First, the implementation problem is outlined, The
use of indicators and operational targets as an aid in
implenlenting policy is then discussed. Next, two
hypotheses about the way in which the Federal Re-
serve’s policy actions are transmitted through the
economic system are presented. Finally, this frame-
work is used to illustrate how alternative policy pre-
scriptions can develop.
The Implementation Problem
The mnonetasy policy process consists of two broad
phases. The policymakers must first decide upon the
movements they desire to achieve in their ultimate
policy objectives such as prices, output, and employ-
ment. Second, they nlust decide how to manipulate
policy instruments such as open market operations,
reserve requirements, ann the rliscount rate to achieve
these desired effects on their ultimate objectives.
This is the impienlentation phase of policy.
To analyze the implementation problem we shall
use the physical analogy’ of heating a rdlom Ivitil a
steam furnace. First, let us set up the heating system,
as shown in Exhibit 1. Our policymaker is Mr. Home-
owner, His policy problem is to maintain the tempera-
lure in his house at a comfortable level, He uses his
room thermometer to give him a measurement of
whether the room temperature is moving in the direc-
tion he desires (the room is getting hotter or colder).
The means by which he implements a decision to
change the room temperature is to adjust the fuel
control lever. If, for example, lIe wants the room
temperature to rise, he adjusts the fuel control level
to increase the flow of fuel to the furnace, lie then
judges whether he has correctly adjusted tile fuel
lever by watching the room thermometer. He knows
there is a lag betweeml the time he adjusts the
fuel control lever and when the room temperature
begins to rise. Taking this lag mto account, if the
reading on the room tilermonleter does not rise suf-
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It is worth emphasizing that the goal of Mr. Home-
owner isad:onlfortable room tn’nsperature, not some
reading on the thermometer. The themnlomlleter is
only a device that helps him to monitor the heating
process.
l-Iowever, let us assuusle that Mr. Homeowner has
an old furnace, and! he is not confident that it works
exactly the way the manufacturer claislls it should.
I-Ic installs two mtermnediate gauges to lsc’lp him in his
control process; -a fuel flow gauge to monitrlr the
flow of fuel between the fuel supply and the furnace,
and a steam pressure gauge on the furnace to monitor
the operation of the furnace. For example, the fuel
flow gauge helps the isomeowner check for leaks in
the fuel line. If this gauge registers a leak, then the
homeowner knows that the fuel flow must be increased
to maintain the same heat from the furnace.
Monetary Policy
Now- let us convert this discussion into an analogy
with the implementation problem of monetary policy.
The fuel control lever becomes the policy instru-
ments of the Federal Reserve; open market opera-
tions, reserve requirements, and the discount rate.
The furnace becomes the financial system, and the
room becomes the real sector of the economy. Mr.
Hosneowner becomes tile Federal Open Market Com-
snittee, and the policy objective becomes something
such as enlploynment, prices, and real output, instead
of room tenlpenatule. The rooiIl thermonseter becomes
a measuring instrunlent such as tlse unempioyment
rate, consumer price index, and GNP in constant
pnces.
Monetary policy implementation would be much
easier if there were complete information about the
way in which policy instruments, financial variables,
and real variables are interrelated. It would only
involve manipulating the policy instruments in a way
that would have a known and desired effect on the
levels and rates of change of the ultimate objectives
of monetary policy. Just as our homeowner, with
complete information about how his furnace operates,
would know where to set the fuel control lever to
get the desired room temperature, the policymakers
would know how close, by manipulating the pohcy
instruments, they could come to achieving their de-
sired ultimate policy objectives. There would be no
possibility of a “slip twixt cup and lip.” The policy
instruments could simply be set at definite values,
and the desired goals of policy would be achieved
subject to any constraints.
Indicators and Operational Targets
The indicator-operational target approach is a
pragmatic mnethnni of impro\-immg the implementation
of monetasy policy. It starts with tile fact that n~one
has perfect infom’mnation about thd- way policy actions
filter through the econosny, are mnon!ifieci by other
factors, and ultimately influeslce real output, prices,
ann! employment. Econorslie research, however, has
provinled sossle theoretical andl empirical informa-
tion about these linkages. The indicator—operational
target approach attempts to employ this information
to guide the process by which policy is implesnented.
Policymakers are concerned with two major ques-
tions when implementing policy. First, what effects
are monetary influences exerting on the ultimate pol-
icy objectives? Are monetary influences exerting a
more, a less, or an unchanged expansionary influence
on the future rates of change of prices-and employ-
ment? An indicator provides information about this
question. Second, pohcymakers want to know how
they should manipulate their policy instruments to
insure that monetary influences are modified to con-
tinue exerting the effect desired by the policynlakcrs,
An operational target provides a method for answer-
ing this second question.
In.dzcators
A nmonr’tam-v policy indicator is an economic variable
that provides inforrmuation about the current thrust of
the financial sector. inclunling Federal Reserve ac-
tions, on future nlovemneslts in the ultunate policy
objectives. Enspirical evinlenee confirms tilat tile ef-
fect of monetary’ polic~’actions on the ultisnate policy
objectives is distributedl over tulle. i-ience, the Fed-
eral Besem’vn’ cannot accurately jud!ge tile degree of
ease or “restraint” its current policy actions am’e
exerting on the uitimate olijectives of policy liy look-
ing directly at measuring instruments such as the
consumer price mdcx and the unemployment rate.
Current changes in the ultimate objectives primarily
reflect the effects of policy actions taken in previous
periods.
A further point must lie clarifier!. Pohcvmakers nb
not need an indicator to tell them their current
intent of policy. They know what they- intenn! to
accomplish with their pohcv actions,tm Pohevmakers
Since the intent of cunresmt policy is not made public until
about 90 days alter the FOMC Meeting tn the “Record of
Policy Actions of the P0MG” appearing in the Federal Re-
serve Bulletin, a measure of policy intent may lie of interest
to market participants. l-lowever, this is a dill enent probiens
frostms tile one with winch this article is concerned.
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want inforimmation about the immfluence their past pohey
actions-are exerting on the futurc- course of the
econonmy.
The cimoice of an indlicator imvolves choosmg some
financial variable that cosmsistentlv provides reliable
information about time cum’rent infiuence of time finan-
cial sector, inclsmding Federal Reserve actions, on
future ec’ononmic activity. In gemmeral termmms, timis re-
cluires that the following relationship imoids between
time indicator and the ultnnate policy objectives;
A change in time rssagaitunle of the indicator is fol-
lowed in’ a predictable eisammge imm time ntmagniLudle of
the ultimate rslmjectives of nmommetary policy.
An economic variable that meets time above crite-
rion can serve as a “scale” that pernmits policy advisers
to mmmake meaningful statemsmesmts about the relative
effects of different policy actions on the ultimate
policy objectives. It provides a means of relative
commlparisiOn of c!ifferemmt sets of policy actions; not
necessarily an absolute means of conmparison.
The usefulness of an indicator hinges on \vhether
or not it consistently supplies reliable infornmation to
the policynmakers. If at tunes the ultimnate policy’
objectives nmove in a direction opposite to the direc-
tion predicted using a given indicator, then in such
instances the indicator provides false information to
the policyssmakers about the thrust of their policy
actions on time uitissmate objectives of monetary pdlhcy.
Operational Targets
Aim operatiommal target for mmmonetary policy’ is an
eeommomic \-ariahle the Fen!erai Reserve attesmmpts to
control directly iii its day--to-day usoney ssmarket oper-
ations. F’ollowing eacim Fedem-ai Opesi Market Com-
snittee ( FOMC ) smmeetismg, the Conmmnsittee issues a
directive tdl time New’ lork Fenleral Reserve Bank. Time
dav—to-n!ay’ imnplemnentation of open mmmarket opera-
tiomms is arried out by time Tradling Desk at time New
Yom’k Bank. In gesmerai, these directives have trar!i-
tiosmaily been worded in broad terms sucis as;
...smmaimmtain the prevaiismg firns com di tiosms imm time
msmommev asmnl short—term credit nmsmrkets.
Although flue c!ireeth-e mmmay appear to be worded
in sosmmewimat ambiguous ternms, the Trading Desk
does not rannionmiy buy’ amid! sell securities. It chooses
sonme financial varialiie or variables to control and
aimmms its day-to—da~-operatiorss in the nmoney nmarket
at controlling this operatiorsai target. Timc- operatiommai
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target, to be of greatest usefulmmess, simould satisfy
timree basic’ criteria as follows
1) Time Federal Reserve simonici be aimle to accur—
ate]v mnseasnre time magnitude of tlse operatiosmal
target over Very simorl perissdis of tismme.
(2) Time Federal Reserve slmouid be aimic to cosstroi
time operational target imm muatmipui atim sg poll cv
ins trusmmesmts. Imm a very sisort penod of time,
time Federal Reserve slsouid be aimle to ollset
any otimem- factors actissg to dimange time nsagilitssdd-’
of time operatiomsal target.
(3) Changes in time smmagssitmsde of time ssperatinsmal
target over aim imsternmediate period of tinme
simoulni dommmumate cisamiges in time 1mm agssitssde of
tise eeomssmom mc variable elm(Isen as ams 1mmdica timr.
The question Immay’ arise as to why’ the concept of
an operational target imas to i~eintroduced once aim
indicator is eimosesm. Why cannot time Federal Reserve
ainm day-to-day operations nlirectiv at time indicator?
Time necessity’ for time introduction of operational
targets, like indicators, arises basically’ from time lack
of perfect informmmatiomm. At a mmmirmismmummm, time Trading
Desk mnnsst have sonme meamms ssf c’vainatismg wimetimer
its day-to-clay’ operations in time mmmonev mmmarket are in
accord w-itim the ismtesmt expressed by time Federal Open
Market Cosmmmmmittee. To nmaxinmize time effectiveness of
its daily operatioims ism the mmmoney’ smmarket, tine Fenieral
Reserve smeeds accnm-ate inforsmmation regarding the in—
fluesmce of fimese actions. In time simort-run nsammy other
factors usually influence the smmovemmment of ismternmedi-
ate variables srselm as time smmonev stock mmd interest
rates. If timese intermmmediate variables are usedi as
operational targets, timen the short-run iimmffrsence of
other factors frequesmtiy causes timese variabies to
trammsmrsit smmisieading ismfornmatiomm to time pohevmmmakers
about time t-lleet timc-ir diay-to-day 1mdlhey’ actions arc
exerting ems time intersnediate—tersmm mm soveimments of the
indicator variables.
In our furnace analogs’, the operatiommai target be-
conmes tim’ fuel supply’. Aim immmdieator is a gauge set
in the process by- wimich mmmonetary pohey- actiosms are
transsmmitted to time real sector of time econorsmy. Usually
time indicator is “attacimed’’ to time financial sector. It
givc’s the Federal Reserve a readimmg omm Imow munch of
the fuel timey are supply’ismg ( timrougim olmemm ssmarket
operations. reserve requiremmmesmts and the discdlunt
mate) is being converted ismto emmerg~’ to rh-n-c the
ccOilo mmmv
Tsvo ilypotheses
Time lack of dollspletc- immforsmmatiors aimout time way’
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requires timc- formmsuiation (IF proposed explanations
imvpotimeses ) about time proee~. A persosm’s choice of
amm indicator asmd atm operational target usually de—
pemmdis tm~mrImm hull imypothesis aimout the way policy
actions am’e trasmsmmmitten! througim time fimmammcial sector
into time real sector. Disagreesmment amimong economists
as to time appropriate clmoicc- of atm immdicator and op-
erational target is basically a disagreemmment as to time
correct represemmtatiosm of time mosmetary policy tr-ans-
smmissiomm muecimanismmm.tm
Two frequentiy used hypotheses about the trans-
mnission process of nmonetaiy policy, the Market In-
terest Rate Hypotimesis and the Money Supply Hy-
potimesis, are coimmpared in Exhibit II. Time policy in-
strummmenmts and uhtinmmate objectives available to pohey’-
nmakers are the samne regardless of whetimer they use
one of fimese hypotimeses or any’ other imypothesis about
the tm’anssimission process. There nmay he differences
hmetween advocates of the two hypotheses, imowever,
concerning the relative imnportance of different policy
instrummments and ultinmate objectives.3
In the Market Interest Rate Hypothesis, the in-
dicator is mmmarket interest rates. An eeononmic variable
such as free reserves (referred to as net borrowed
reserves when borrowings exceed excess reserves) is
generally chosen as the operational target. In a
broader context, free reserves can he viewed as a
substitute for a number of simort-tenmm money immarket
factors, such as time Federal funds rate, “tone and
feel of the mnarket,” and the Treasury bill rate. In the
Money Supply Hypothesis, the indicator is the growtis
rate of the mooney stock (currency- plus demmmand
deposits of time nonbasmk public). Time operational
target is the net source base, total source base, or
monetary base, as corsmputed by the St. Louis Federal
Reserve Bank.4
tmIn soimme eases, individuals ms,ay accept as’ eeosmonmic variable,
such as nmommey, as an indicator based solely on enmpirical evi-
dence, and still not accept a hypotlmesis in which nmoney
plays a key role ism deternmissiog ecommommmic activit.
iSFor example, many supporten of the Money Snpply Ily-
pothesis have traditionally placed mmmore reliammee 0mm open Immar—
-ket opemations and adv,mcated very lhmnted use of the othmer
policy iimstr,msime,mts, particularly Regulatiotm Q. tmlncreases irs Federal Reserve credit ( lmoldissgs of securities,
discounts and adva,mces, ammd flnmat ) , time gold stimck, and
Treasury cnrrency outstasmdiimg iimc,’ease time stock of source
base. Immcreases in Treasury deposits at the Federal Resen-e,
Treasury- cash holdings, asmd other deposits and other Federal
Reserve accounts decrease time stock of source base.
Time smet source base is tsmtal source base ssct of Immenmlmcr
bank borrowings. The mmsonctary base is total source base ad-
justed for reserve requirenseut changes. See Leonail C.
Andes-sen and Jerry L. Jordan, ‘The Monetary Base — Ex-
planations and Analytical Use,” timis Review (August 1968),
pp. 7-14.
Eximibit III ilssstrates time airalogy between time imeat-
immg sy’stemms ammd time mosmetary’ policy smmecimasmisnm.
Timc’ Fedleral Reserve looks at a wide range of data.
ismciuding time ummemmmphovsmment rate, eommsulmmer and!
w’imoiesaie price indexes, mmd real GNP to evahuate
what is imappemmimmg to emmmploynmesmt. prices, ammci real
dlutput. Time Federal Reserve timemm acljrssts nmpemm mmmarket
operatiosms, reserve reqimiresmmemmts, or the cliscoummt rate
to achieve its oimjeetives witim respect to emmmploy’smment,
Exhibit II
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Exhibit III
prices, and real output. By altering the policy instru-
ments, the Federal Reserve changes the flow of fuel
to time econosmmy-, The fuel supply is mmmeasured in units
of base money or units of free reserves. To analyze
the future effect of these actions on the real economy,
the Federal Reserve then would look at its gauge on
the financial sector, either the growth of time nmoney
stock or time level of sssarket ismterest rates. To furtimer
nmonitor the process, time Federal Reserve mmmay use
anotimer gauge, equivalemmt to the fuel flow gauge, sucim
as time Treasury bill rate for time Market Ismterest Rate
Hypotlmesis mr the smmommey mmmuitipher for time Money
Supply IIvpothesisJ~Timis type of gauge signals leak-
ages in the flow of fuel tm time fismammcial systesmm.
Exammmimmismg Eximihit II asmd Exhibit III. we can see
where sommme chifferermees of opinion nmight arise about
the ismfiuence of Federal Reserve actiorms. For one
thing, the t\vo imypotimeses in Eximibit II mmmeasure the
fuel supply by dlifferent smmeans. One vie\vpoint immeas-
ures time f!ow of fuel in tersims of base, the other ism
tersmms of free reserves. Under time Money Su~mpiy
Iiypotisesis, time Federal Reserye is su~mpiy-ing nmore
lbs mmsosscy mmmsmltmplser s isismimsam in h umlin it mmcc 0mm tlmc nsouc
supply process of nil those factors other timan cimanges imm time
base, By mmmonitoring time smmovessmemmts mf the esssmmlmosmeimts ssf time
omnitiplier, the Federal Reserve could detes-smsi,me time elI eets
of aims’ given growth of base imn the grsn’tlm smf tIme ssmosme-v
stmck. For exasmmpie, amm immem-ease imm the public’s demised imold-
ings mf cssrrency relative to deimmand deposits wosild dlecrease
time growtlm smf nmoney- -associated w-ith an)’ givesm grsssvtlm if
base. This would lIe a ‘‘leakage” tmetsveesm time fuel supply
and the furnace. By- immcrcasismg time flsmw of lmase, time Vedermml




fuel, if time growtlm rate of time lmase immcreases. Time
Market Interest Rate Hypothesis takes an increase
in the level of free reserves as a mmmeasure of an
aeceleratiomm ism tIme flow’ of fuel.
A second area of disagreeoment can c!eveiop about
the mmmanner inm wimic-Im time flow of fuel frommm time Fed-
eral Reserve is converted into a flosv of total s1mending.
Supporters of the Money Supply II~pothesis contend
that an increased flow of base smmcmmmey’ inmto time fisman—
ciai sector is converted! immto an immc-reaseci growtim of
time smmoney stock, whieim results imm aim increased! flow
of total s1mendmimg, immfluesmcing emmm1mioy’nmemmt, prices, and
real outimut. Time altenmative view’ is timat an increased
ievel of free reserves is eosmverted! iim time financial
seetnmr immto lower smmarket immterest rates. wimich result
its aim immcreasecl flow’ of tmtai spendhmmg and imemmce real
varialmies arc’ iimfluerneeni. In our analogy, this diuestion
mmmay- ime imimrasedl, “hdmw’ is fuel cormverted irmto energy
that drives time ecoimoomy?”
Su1mpom’ters of time- two lmy’potimeses are mommitoring
time progm-ess of 1molicy- by’ diffc’rent gauges, wlmere
timd’ gauges am’e attachmed to time samsme part of time
imrocess. Siimce time grmwtlm of tlmc’ smmosmey- stock and
sssarket niterest rates fredjuentim,’ nmmos’e in timc’ sanme
dlired-tiotss. siilmstaimtial dim’ergesmces tmf opinioim oftesm
arise regardimmg time correct jmohcy’ action tcm take to
ac-imieve time sasisc- ultimate obmjc’e-tive.
For exausmlmhe, supjmose thmat time’ su~mportc’rsof
Market !msterest Rate Hvpotimesis look at timeir
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observe that market rates are rising. If they desire
no change in the influence of policy, they may
conclude that the flow of fuel to the financial sector
~vill not be converted into enough energy (low
market rates) to maintain the rate of growth of real
output and employment they desire. Hence, they
would advise that policy instruments be used to raise
the level of free reserves (pump in more fuel).
However, let us assume that the supporters of the
Money Supply Hypothesis look at their indicator and
observe that the growth rate of money is accelerating.
They conclude that the fuel being supplied by Fed-
eral Reserve actions would be converted into a ~og-
ressively more rapid flow of total spending, and they
advise that the policy instruments should be used to
slow the growth of the base (pump in fuel at a
slower rate).
At this point a substantial divergence of opinion
about the reason for the change in market interest
rates arises between the supporters of the two hy-
potheses. This difference of analysis has important
implications for the conduct of monetary policy. The
supporters of the Market Interest Rate Hypothesis
contend that Federal Reserve policy actions are dont-
mating the movements in interest rates and that
the rise in market rates will result in a s1owdown in
the real economic activity. The supporters of the
Money Supply Hypothesis, however, contend that
changes in the public’s demand for credit are domin-
afing movements in market interest rates and that
Federal Reserve actions through their influence on
total spending are influencing the public’s demand
for credit. In terms of our analogy, the Money Supply
Hypothesis asserts that the market interest rate in-
dicator is not insulated 1mm developments in the
real sector. As the real sector heats up (employment,
real output, and prices rise), this influences the read-
ings on the market interest rate indicator.
To analyze the importance of this difference of
analysis, we shall first discuss the interdependence
of free reserves and the base. Then the implications
for monetary policy of this interdependence are ex-
amined. irs the following presentation, the net source
base is used, and hereafter when the terms “base
money” or “base” are used, they will refer to net
source base. The same results may be derived by
using the monetary base or source base.
Interdependence
Free reserves are calculated by subtracting member
bank borrowings from member bank excess reserves.
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One of the components of the source base on the
uses side of the balance sheet is member bank excess
reserves. The net source base is obtained by sub-
tracting member bank borrowings from the source
base. Therefore, the components of the net source
base may be combined so that free reserves is one of
the uses of the net source base.° If the Federal
Reserve alters the level of free reserves, and if cur-
rencyheld by the public and vault cash in nonmember
banks are held constant, the net source base is
changed in the same direction. Free reserves and the
net source base are not independent of each other.
Actions taken by the Federal Reserve to alter or
maintain the existing value of one of these opera-
tional targets exert an influence on the other.
To analyze the importance of this interdependence,
the bank credit market is introduced. Supply and
demand conditions in this market are specified as
follows: -
aS = S = ccnnmerc’ial banks’ supply schedule for bank
credit
1) = public’s demand schedule for bank credit
The equilibrium condition for the bank credit market
is given as:
S=D
(Amount of credit banks are willing to supply =
amount of bank credit demanded by the public).
In the above expression, (a) denotes the bank
credit multiplier, which is the connecting link be-
tween the amount of net source base (B) and the
amount of credit banks are willing to extend.’
°ln this article, the net source base is denoted by B. Gener-
ally this concept is denoted as B’. The superscript has been
removed to avoid any confusion that might arise when the
bank’s credit supply curve is specified later.
Tlmt’ net source base is defined in the following manner:
B =Bm..~A~l~V+CP
where: K’” = member bank reserves = lit + B’
V = vault cash holdings of nonmember banks
A = member bank borrowings from the Federal
Reserve Banks
C” = currency held by the nonbank public
= excess reserves of member banks
Br = required reserves of member banks
Free reserves (lit) are defined as follows:
K’ = B’ — A
The relationship between the net source base and free
reserves can be expressed as follows:
B = (Re~.A)+ Br÷ C~+ V = W+ lit + C~ + V
fl’he money multiplier and bank credit multiplier summarize
all those factors, other than changes in the net source base,
that aflect the nioney supply process. When the monetary
base is used, the Influence of reserve requirement changes
and member bank borrowings are included In movements in
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Both time hank credit multiplier, and hence the amount
of credit banks are Willing to extend, and time publics
demand for bank credit are dependent upon the hank
credit market interest rate.
The public’s demand for bank credit and the
bank’s credit supply also depend upon a number of
other factors. For example. the public’s demand for
credit depends upon the expected rate of return on
real capital and upon price expectations. The banks’
supply of credit depends upon the amount and rate
of growth of the net source base. In our following
illustrations, these factors would appear as shifts in
the supply and demand schedules.
A rise in market interest rates could result from
either a shift in the credit supply curve, or a shift
in the credit demand curve, or some combination of
the two. The effect of a shift in the credit supply
cun-e is shown in Figure I. The credit supply curve
shifts from S~to 5-, and, in the resulting adjustment
process, the interest rate rises to i2 and bank credit
outstanding falls to E~.
Now let us look at an alternative explanation for
the rise in market rates. Suppose that the rise in
rates was clue to a shift in the public’s demand for
credit. This appears as a shift to the right of the pub-
lic’s demand curve from D1 to D-1, as shown in Figure
II.
At the market interest rate (i1
), the quantity of
hank credit demanded by the public (E4 ) exceeds
the amount of credit the banks are willing to supply
(E5
). given the stock of base and the value of the
bank credit multiplier. If the Federal Reserve System
does not increase the growth rate of the net source
base in response to the rise in interest rates, but
permits market interest rates to adjust to clear the
credit market, the interest rate rises toward i~. As
the yields on loans and securities rise, the amount of
the I,ase, instead of in the ornitiplier. The money i mu Itipiicr
assocmated with the net sou:-ee hasc is:
I-i—k
= (r -- h) (I±t ±d) + k
k and d, respectively, are the ratios of currency held hy the
puhlie and tJS. Government deposits at connoercial hanks to
the deniand deposit eo:nponcnt of the money stock.
r, b, and t. respectively, are the ratios of hank reserves,
member hank borrowings, and time deposits to commercial
hank deposit liabilities (excluding interhank deposits
Ti ii- rescue ratio, ( tl srough the depen dci Ce of ha: :ks- de-
rived excess reserves ) , the horrowm g ratio and thi’ time de—
posi ratio are illI dept-nd emit upon credit n market in tcrest ratd’s.
Sr an illustration of —the derivation of a money multiplier,
see Jerry L. Jordan, ‘‘Elements of Money Stock Detennina—
tion, this Reeieme 1 October 1969) pp. 1.0—19.
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credit banks are willing to supply rises’, banks reduce
their excess reserves, increase horro\\’ings from Fed’
eral Reserve Banks, and raise the yields they offer
to attract time deposits.~The new equilihnum quan-
titv of bank credit demanded and supplied is E::.
The pohevnsakers do not observe these supply
and demand curves shifting up and down: all they
observe is the increase in the reading on the market
interest rate indicator. If the policvmakers believe
5\\ hethim h uk ciedit nu c 1st’. om died: c isis di pends Iipon
the relationship between Regolation () ceiling rates and the
yields banks oiler or: tune deposits. If banks are already at
Regulation (~)ceilings, then an increase in the public’s die—
‘ma: md h r credit i-es,:ltin g in a rise in nmarkit in merest rates
nia’.’ lead to dishmtermcdintio: s and a decrease in 1 mrmk crcdit.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS MARCH 1971
the rise in market rates to ia represents a leftward
shift ( decrease) in the credit supply curve, as in
Figure 1, and they desire no change in the influence
of policy, they may now increase their purchases of
securities to raise the level of free reserves. This pol-
icy action, according to the Market Interest Rate
Hypothesis, would shift the credit supply curve to the
right, from S. hack toward S~, and market yields
would decline from i, back toward
If, however, the rise in rates resulted from a right-
ward shift of the publics denandl for credit ( as shown
in Figure II). then to prevent market interest rates
rising to i~,the Federal Reserve must expand the net
source base enough to shift the banks’ credit supply
curve to 5:;, as shown in Figure III. At a market inter—
est rate of i1, banks are now willing to supply a
larger a:miount ( F ) of credit. Under these conditions,
the operational policy of :‘aising free reserves, which
accelerates the growth of the base, results in a more
rapid expansion of hank credit and none’. than would
result in the situations ills :strated by Figures I and 11.
Supporters of the Money Supph- I—lvpothesis assert
that F’ederal Reserve actions shifting the credit supply
i’urve would he self—defeating, if the rise in :narket
rates reflected a shift in the public’s demand cur’.-e.
In a sitt:ation such as that illustrated bx’ Figure III,
the money stock expands very rapidly. The Money
Supply Hypothesis predicts that market rates would
onl~’temporarily remain at i1 As the feedback effect
of the rise in the money stock on total spending is
reflected in the publics ~1e:s mand for credit shifting
the de::iand curve further to the right), the Federal
Reserve would again have to increase the net source
base to maintain the market yield at i1
, Under these
conditions. chatigc’s in the base are determinerl by
shifts in the pm:hlic’s demandl for bank credit via the
:‘e:tction of the monetary anthoritic-s. This implies
that the Federal Reserve \vomdii give m:p its control
over the money supply ~ lotal spending would




This section illustrates how altc’rnative policy pre-
scriptions i-an arise in s-esponse to changing economic
cosalitions. Two diflere:mt sets of conditions are speci-
fied, and thd’ mnonetary polic\:nakers are assumed to
:nake a policy decision based upon this info:-snation.
Condition I
State of tIme econom : Time ecommomv is operating at
[mill emnplo~ment - Aim is creasing propom-tion of
total spending is reflected ill rising prices. Com—
merci~dbanks have raisedl their ofi cring rates
Oil time deposits to Regnlation Q ceiling rates,
Policy decision: Polieymakers slmif t time locus of their
attentio mm fm-on real oil tps it a mid d’: upioynsent
to aeh ieyii m g stable prices,
Using the Market Interest Rate Hypothesis, policy-
makers reason that interest rates :nust be pushc~d
higher to slow total spending and bring agg:’egate
demand in line with the productive capacity of the
economy. Consequently, the’.’ adopt an operating
strategy designed to raise market rates. This involves
using policy instrtmnments to reduce the level of free
reserves. The Trading Desk is instructed to “pursue
open mnarket operations with a view to obtaining
tightc-r money market conditions.” The result of these
open market actions is to decrease the growth rate of
the base, which results in a slowing in the rate of
expansion of tile money stork.
As market interest ratt-s continue to rise, banks can
no longc-r eonspc’te for time deposits and disinter—
:uediation begins. Consc-quentl~ thc- amount of earn-
ing assets banks can holrl dc’elines. In restructuring
their portfolios, banks attemnpt first to reduce their
holdings of lowest-yielding assets. The tune sequence
of this process would probably N’ declines in their
holdlings of short—ter:m m Coyenimmient securitic-s first.
[his sIsift in fociis of atlentim iii dod’s not mdan the psihey—
mmak ers no’.’. igrinr~’thd’ glow lii riste mmf real outpmit muir
1
emil—
ph iv: lie:it. ‘l’l md aIii Iitv sf tlsc- polieyos akc’m’s to act: id’ye’a price
ohsleetive is i’mmilitionc’d by thm’ i ishad-nec of their pu
1
ies’ae—
tions on ru-al mafiput and m’nsployment.
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foilo’.ved by declines in holrlings of municipal scetiri-
ties. As long as possible, banks try to rerlucr- lsolrlings
of securities in orrler to continue to acquire- business
loans.’~
The impact in the e’:-edit nsarkr’t is a sharp decline
in the prices of municipal bonrls and Governtnent
securities. Cries of a liquidity crisis, or credlit crunch”
may arise in the financial community. Other financial
intermerharies such as sayings’ and loan associations
are also affected by thc- rapidly rising inte-rest rates.
Aelrleci to the outcry from the securities markets mnay
be the asserterl danger of sonic- possible failures
of savings ann loan associations. Thr’ economists who
use market intes-c’st rates anrl other financial issarket
conrlitions as thm.’ir imlicators issight warn, in termns
of our furnace analogy, that “there is too much pres-
sure anrl the furnace is going to blow up!”
Thr’ scenario outlinr-el in this stage eorresponrls, in
rough form, to monetarv policy in 1966. In late 1965
aurl earl 1966, monetary policynmakers moved to a
niom’r’ restnctive nsonc-tarv policy’ aimerl at reducing
the “emergence of inflationary pressures. During the
summer of 1966 the Federal Reserve pursued a prog-
ressiyely more restrictive policy. As market interest
rates rosr above Regulation 9 ceiling rates, the Board
of Governors did not raise Regulation 9 ceiling rates.
As fsmnls fiowedl out of banks awl nonbank savings
institutions, these institutions faced a new and costly
period of portfolio anljustment. Thr- result of these
policies culmirmaterl in August 1966 in a relatively
short-lived liquurlity r’risis, called the ‘Credit Crunch
of 1966.”
Under such conditions, the Federal Reserve policy-
makers face a very rIilficult decision. Using interest
rates as indicators, the information transmmuttr-rl to
thetn is that they aIr’ following vem-v restrictive poli-
cies, Slower growth of hank credit, and other informa-
tion transimmitti-cI to theni rlirr-etly fro,mm financial mnar—
kets and the financial intermediaries, reinforce this
view. The correct operating strategy now appears to
he to reversr- quickly open market opr’rations, andl
“ease the pressures in dir’ financial niarkr’ts.’’’
° The rise’ in tIll’ slsarr’ of Ionus iii ham:k is5se ts dormtug pr ni ids
whes s hanks mumost rid
1
mlii- the total vol Iliii d’ or growth mate
of
1
ao ik cit-dit a hscs meII c-its [hc- lotug—nu mm lii mfitalsil ity of hank—
d:ostummcd relations. Sc-c’ F rlward l Kanc ~mnrlRnm’t ol C
Nt ~d kici. --Bank Pr rtf ohiii Allocatious - Depi aut N’ sruahml :tv. am md
[lie’ ,kyailabiI ity 1)oetrind’.’’ (3mm m’trrly Id)0 rmmsil of Lion o~mm ii’s
F’ehr:tary I 9651, Pp. 113-31,
muSee Albert P. Borger, “A 1 historical Analysis of tIn’ Credmt
Crunch of 1906,” this Recieme 1 September 1969), pp. 1:3-30.
I ~ should also he sioterl that the Federal Reserve climes not
make policy decisions in a vacouomm. At suet, timnes the Fed—
e-ral Reserve may he inicier comisiderahle pnhi mc or gove’rn—
oient p:yssi Ire to e’ase its policy.
If the money stock is being used as an indicator,
the rerlucerl growth rate of money’ resulting from [he
slowing in the rate of increase of the base also signals
that the policymakers have begun to exert a less
expansionarv influence on the ultimatr- policy’ objce-
th’es. Ho\vd”.-er. the supporters of the Money Supply
I-Iypothesis would argue that the sharp rise in credit
market interest rates -ann the “ahovr- ave’ragr’ liquidity
pressures in the financial market” do not necessarily
signal the rlesirability’ of a significant reversal of
operating strategy. The key elements of a less expan-
sionarv mnonetary- policy are a reduce-cl expansion of
rlemand rieposits and hank credit, This is the neces-
sary prelimimu’y to the clesirenl policy objectives of
reduced aggregate dr-manrl and hence a reduced
rate of increase of prices.
An analysis hasedl on the Mone\’ S~spplyHypothesis
agrees that a continued operational policy of restrir’t—
ing the g’-owth s-ate of the base would, in the short—run,
lead to higher le\-cls of market intr-rest rate-s. Over
the intermnedliate-term, however, the resulting slower
growth of the money stock woukl exert a dampr’ning
influence on total spending. Tin- slowrlown in total
spending would exercise a dampening inllud’nce on
thr- upward pressure-s on prices’’~tndlalso lead to a
reduction in the rid-mann1 for d:redlit. Hence, pursuing
such an operational target would, ac-co:-ding to this
ha’pothesis. lead to lo\\er market interest rates and
the desired ultimate policy objective of lower prices.
Con.ditioni. 2
Let us now assume tlvtt the policvmakers have en-
gaged in ~t set of polics’ actions that resm,nlted in a
slowing of d’eosmo: umic activity, l’Isis pern:mits’’an analysis
of the iii tphieations of dlifherr’mmt mm mrthonls of imm mplemnent—
ing polie’s’ in a i-ye1ical downtn rn.
State of the ec’ommomsm\ : The growtlm sate of real ont—
pot has been redmmeed well he-low its lo:sg—rmos
potential. The lesel ol ummuensplovment has riseim
above 5 per cent,
Polur’v decision: Porsnm.’ a :umonetary policy tlm~tt me—
suIts ut au immereasedi growth rate of real ontpmit
ititil hence a decreased ld’yel of m:sme:nplovmsieust.
In an r’eono,nie downturn, if the Fedleral Reserve
uses tnarket interest rates as its indicator, it might
conclude that the falling mnam’ket rates signal monetan’
polin’y’ has hr’co:oe “easier” than pre’.’iottsly. This in-
terpretation dependls upon tIme condition that the dIe—
crease in intr-rest rates is resulting from a shift in
the creilit supply curse. If the nleereasd’ in intern’st
rates reflects a nlecrease iu the (Ienmand for erenlit,
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then Federal Reserve policy may be “tighter” than
previously. The fall in interest rates raises the banks’
desired excess reserve ratio which operates to reduce
the money multiplier. Also, if the downturn has been
preceded by a “crunch” in the financial markets, this
may also operate to raise banks’ desired excess re-
serve ratio. If during the “crunch” the Federal Re-
serve exercised relatively’ strict administration of the
discount window, this factor would- lower the banks’
desired ratio of borrowings to deposits. Therefore, the
decline in the growth rate of money, resulting from
a slower growth of the base, is reinforced by the fall
in market interest rates.’3 Hence, the monetary ag-
gregates transmit the opposite infonnation, that policy
actions are having more of a restrictive effect on the
future movements of real output, employment and
prices,
A rise in the member banks’ desired holdings of
excess reserves, and a decrease in their borrowings
from Federal Reserve banks, result in a rise in the
level of free reserves. Under these conditions, to re-
duct the operational target of free reserves below
its previous level, the Federal Reserve must engage in
an even more aggressive policy of open market sales.
The result is an even more rapid decrease in the net
source base, and hence a further downward impetus
on the money supply process.
This stage might be labeled the ‘Let us turn it
around”stage. As our previous discussion implies, the
choice of an indicator and an operational target have
important implications for the ability of the Federal
Reserve to turn the economy around to a renewed
period of expansion in the time period desired by
the policymakers. To briefly outline the problems that
might arise, let us assume that the policyinakers
decide that to achieve their ultimate objectives the
- money stock should increase at a more rapid rate.
However, although policymakers accept the growth
rate of the money stock as their indicator, let us
assume that policy is still implemented using the
operational target of the Market Interest Rate Hy-
pothesis. When judging the impact of day-to-day open
market operations on the growth rate of money, the
Trading Desk uses free reserves or, with equivalent
results, the Federal funds rate. The growth rate of
money is used to gauge the extent to which Federal
Reserve actions are being converted into energy that
will drive the economy upward. However, the flow of
fuel is measured in free reserve units instead of in
units of base.
“The reader may refer to footnote 7, page 25, to See how
these factors would lower the money multiplier.
Under the economic conditions set forth for this
stage, the equilibrium level of free reserves would be
expected to rise and the Federal funds rate would
fall. If the monetary authorities are guided in their
open market operations by either of these operational
targets, they may be reluctant to pursue an ag-
gressive policy of open market purchases. Therefore,
the growth of the base may be slower than what is
required to achieve the desired growth rate of the
money stock.
The policymaker’s failure to achieve some publicly
announced growth rate of money does not mean that
the Federal Reserve cannot control money. The fail-
ure to reach the desired monetary growth path may
result from using an inappropriate operational target.
As shown earlier, if the Federal Reserve tries to re-
sist market-determined movements of interest rates,
without taking adequate account of the influence of
of these actions on the growth rate of the base,
policymakers may not be able to achieve the growth
of money they desire. The Federal Reserve can
continue to we open market operations to smnooth
short-run pressures in the financial markets arising
from situations such as Treasury financings or a Cam-
bodian Crisis. However, to control the growth rate of
the money stock, it must consider the effect of these
actions 01) the growth of the base, which dominates
the intermediate-term growth rate of the money
stock.” Empirical evidence has been presented that~
by combining information about the past move-
ments of money multiplier with a base operational
target, the Federal Reserve can exercise reasonably
close control over the intennediate-tenn growth rate
of the money stock.1~
Summary
This paper has presented a simplified explanation
of the implementation problem of monetary policy.
The actual implementation process is somewhat more
complicated. For example, we assumed that the Fed-
eral Reserve had only one ultimate objective. In an
actual situation its ability to achieve stable prices
will be constrained by the effect that its policy
actions have on employment. In our furnace analogy,
this would be a case where the homeowner is con-
cerned not only with the room temperature, but also
with the relative humidity in the room. The speed
with which the homeowner can increase the room
“For a further discussion of this point, see MIan Meltzer,
“Controlling Money.” this Review (May 1989) pp. 18-24.
‘%ionel Kalish, “A Study of Money Stock Control,” Journal
of Finance (September 1970), pp. 761-776.
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temperature to a comfortable level and still niaintam
a tolerable level of hmllidiv is dependent upon a
number of conditions under winch tile process is
carried out initial conditions ) , such as tile outside
temperature. Likewise, the ability of the Federal
Reserve to influence prices while maintaining a “tol-
erable level of emnplor-nlent will depend upon initial
conditions, such as price cxpeetations. the price and
employment response of producers to a decrease ill
total spending, aml the structure of the labor market.
Monetary policy at pu-sent and in the foreseeable
future must be inlplemen ted under conditions of less
than perfect information about the structural relation-
ships linking the eeonomv together. [he indicator—
operational target method uses existing knowledge to
achieve efficient implementation of policy. This article
has shown that the correct choice of an indicator.
and an operating strategy for controlling that indica-
tor, are important problems. If the Federal Reserve
follosvs an indicator that is providing false informa—
tion. then tins can have severe consequences for
prices and employment.
Movements of nlarket mterest rates and the growth
rate of the money stock frequently give conflicting
information about the thrust of monetary policy. The
possibilit- of conflict hetsveen proponents of these two
indicators is greatest at times when it is most ililpOr-
tant that the Federal Reserve accurately assess tIle
thrust of monetary policy actions. Tile operational
strategy used to influence the level of market inter-
est rates affects the relative expansionary or eontrae-
tionarv influences tile Federal Reserve is exerting on
the money supply process. If the Federal Reserve
~.attempts to ollset changes in levels of market interest
rates that result from slnfts in tile publics demand
for credit, then tIle growth rate of the base becomes
endogenously determined. Under these conditions, the
growth of tIle IiiOil~Vstock reinforces expansions or
contractions in total spending ~t1ld ilence mno\-enlents
in prices and employment.
Tb i~article is’ ti cailahie (Is Repi’mt No. 66.
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